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OBSCENITY IN THE MAILS
Harvey Lyle Zuckman*
For nearly one hundred years the federal government has had as one
of its functions the suppression of mail trade in obscene and pornographic
matter.' The first federal enactment in this field provided that the mailing
of an obscene book, pamphlet, picture, print, or other publication with
knowledge of its nature was a misdemeanor.2 The present postal obscenity
law' dates back to 1873 and is sometimes referred to as the Comstock
Law because of the support given its passage by the notorious Anthony
Comstock, agent for the New York Society for the Suppression of Vice.
While its original wording would seem to suggest that the statute was
purely penal in nature,4 the Post Office Department inferred from it inde-
pendent civil authority to restrain the mailing of obscene matter.' Thus,
the federal government, by virtue of the Comstock Law, utilizes each of
the two recognized means for the suppression of objectionable printed
matter-criminal punishment subsequent to publication and administra-
tive restraint prior to publication or distribution.
Until quite recently little legal or lay attention was paid to the federal
government's two-pronged attack on mail pornography and obscenity.
However, two recent obscenity cases, one construing and upholding the
validity of the Comstock Law's criminal provisions6 and the other ques-
tioning the Post Office's system of administrative restraint,' have created
much interest in this field. This article is devoted to an analysis of the
present status of postal obscenity law and makes recommendations for
legislative change where such action seems necessary or desirable.
I. SUBSEQUENT CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT
Section 1461 of the Criminal Code of the United States' declares "every
obscene, lewd, lascivious, indecent, filty or vile article, matter, thing, de-
vice, or substance" to be "nonmailable matter." Mailing of such matter
with knowledge of its character is punishable by a fine of not more than
5,000 dollars or imprisonment for not more than five years, or both, for
a first offense. Subsequent violations are punishable by a fine of not more
*LL.B., 1959, New York University School of Law. Member California Bar.
'See Paul & Schwartz, Obscenity in the Mails: A Comment on Some Problems of Federal
Censorship, 106 U. PA. L. REv. 214, 217 n. 9 (1957).
213 Stat. 507 (1865). The Senate intended the act to operate only as a criminal statute
and not as an enactment authorizing postal censorship. Paul & Schwartz, supra note 1, at 217.
318 U.S.C. 5 1461 (1958).41n 1876 the statute was recodified. In this form it declared that obscene matter was
nonmailable and was not to be conveyed by the Post Office. 19 Star. 90 (1876). The wording
of the recodification is essentially the same as present 5 1461 of the Criminal Code of the
United States.
sPaul & Schwartz, supra note 1, at 217.
tRoth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
7Grove Press, Inc. v. Christenberry, 175 F. Supp. 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
818 U.S.C. § 1461 (1958).
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than 10,000 dollars or by imprisonment for not more than ten years, or
both. While first amendment problems are implicit in the statute, until
recently little constitutional law had developed around it.9
A. The Roth Decision
The central constitutional issue raised by Section 1461 is, of course,
whether obscene expression is within the protection of the first amendment
guarantees of free speech and press. If it were, the government would likely
have to prove in the particular prosecution that the obscenity created a
"clear and present danger" of activity so inimical to the public interest
that first amendment rights had to be subordinated." This would be a
very nearly impossible task because of the necessarily subjective evaluation
of allegedly obscene expression." However, the Supreme Court had long
assumed that obscenity was outside the pale of constitutional protection. 2
In 1957 the question was squarely presented to the Court in Roth v.
United States.'
3
Roth, a well-known publisher and seller of books, photographs, and
magazines emphasizing sex,'4 was convicted in the Southern District of
New York on four counts of violating Section 1461. His conviction was
affirmed by the Second Circuit. Ignoring the jury finding that the matter
sent by Roth through the mails was obscene, the Supreme Court stated
that the dispositive question was whether obscenity is utterance protected
by the first amendment. The Court answered this question in the negative,
saying that "obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected
speech or press."' 5 Therefore, there exists no constitutional infirmity in
punishing individuals who send obscene matter through the mails, and
Roth's conviction could not be set aside.
9In a sweeping dictum in Ex Parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 737 (1878), the Supreme
Court presumed to pass on the constitutionality of the act when it declared that "the only
question for our determination relates to the constitutionality of the act; and of that we have
no doubt." However, the sole issue before the Court was the authority of Congress under the
postal power to establish post offices and post roads. No issue was raised or considered under
the first amendment. Lockhart & McClure, Literature, the Law of Obscenity, and the Con-
stitution, 38 MINN. L REV. 295, 353 n. 379 (1954).
In Rosen v. United States, 161 U.S. 29 (1896), the Court seemed to hold that the
statute was not void for vagueness.
1oCf. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919); Schenck v. United States, 249
U.S. 47 (1919).
11"The unfortunate fact is that today relatively little information is available on the effect
of sex literature on human conduct." Lockhart & McClure, supra note 9, at 385. See Paul &
Schwartz, supra note 1, at 230-31 n. 43.
'2Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931) (dictum). In Doubleday & Co. v. New
York, 335 U.S. 848 (1948), the Supreme Court affirmed by an equally divided vote without
opinion a New York Court of Appeals decision, 297 N.Y. 687, 77 N.E.2d 6 (1947) (mem.),
upholding the conviction of Doubleday for publishing an obscene book, "Memoirs of Hecate
County," by Edmund Wilson. The sole question before the Supreme Court was whether the
first and fourteenth amendments protected books attacked as obscene. Lockhart & McClure,
supra note 9, at 299-301.
13354 U.S. 476 (1957).
:4For an interesting background case, see Roth v. Goldman, 172 F.2d 788 (2d Cir.
1949), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 938 (1949).
'5 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. at 485.
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This holding raises many difficult legal problems, some of which the
Court anticipated. The Court neatly disposed of the argument that the
statute punishes mere incitation to impure sexual thoughts not shown to
be related to any overt antisocial conduct. Since obscentity is not within
the area of constitutional protection, the "clear and present danger" issue
is never reached. Hence, the federal government may punish any mailer
regardless of the effect of the mailing so long as the matter is found to be
obscene.
It then became imperative for the Court to attempt to set some standard
by which obscenity could be distinguished from constitutionally protected
expression. This problem has long troubled the courts because obscene
expression must, of necessity, be measured by the subjective reaction of
the audience to whom the utterance or writing is directed." For its stand-
ard the Court embraced the test, first laid down in United States v. One
Book Called "Ulysses,"" of whether to the average person, applying con-
temporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material
taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest. 8 The Court made it quite
clear that sex and obscenity are not to be treated as synonymous but that
reference to sex is obscene only when made in a manner appealing solely
to prurient interest.'
Finally, the Court held in Roth that while the wording of Section 1461
lacks precision, the statute would not be struck down as void for vague-
ness since the language of the statute gives sufficiently definite warning as
to the type of conduct proscribed. Thus, today there is no longer any doubt
2GThe courts have not been the only organs of government so troubled. It is reported
that the delegates to the Geneva Conference on the Suppression of the Circulation and Traffic
in Obscene Publications could not define obscenity. This prompted Aldous Huxley to write
that "after... having triumphantly asserted that they did not know what they were talking
about, the members of the Congress settled down to their discussion." HUXLEY, VLGARITr Y
IN IjTEmRAE 1 (1930).
175 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1933), affld, 72 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1934); accord, Walker
v. Popenoe, 149 F.2d 511 (D.C. Cir. 1945); Parmelee v. United States, 113 F.2d 729 (D.C.
Cir. 1940); United States v. Levine, 83 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1936).
1In accepting this test the Court rejected the English view as enunciated in Regina v.
Hicklin, L.R. 3 Q.B. 360 (1868), that material had to be judged obscene by the effect of
an isolated passage upon persons particularly susceptible to prurient appeal.
In its opinion in Roth the Supreme Court defined "prurient interest" by citing Webster's
Dictionary. ". .. Itching, longing, uneasy with desire or longing; of persons, having itching,
morbid, or lascivious longings; of desire, curiosity or propensity, lewd." WEBSTER, NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1996 (unabr. 2d ed. 1949). The Courts cited § 207.10 of
the Model Penal Code for its definition of obscenity. "A thing is oscene if, considered as a
whole, its predominant appeal is to prurient interest, i.e., a shameful or morbid interest in
nudity, sex, or excretion, and if it goes substantially beyond customary limits of candor in
description or representation of such matters. ." MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.10 (Tent.
Draft No. 6, 1957). Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. at 487 n. 20.
19Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. at 487. That the Court intended to define obscenity
in very narrow terms seems apparent from its first definitive opinion in this area following
Roth. In Kingsley International Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the University of New York,
360 U.S. 684 (1959), reversing 4 N.Y.2d 349, 151 N.E.2d 197, 175 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1958),
it was held that the advocacy of an idea no matter how violently at odds with the prevailing
moral code is protected by the first and fourteenth amendments, providing prurient interest is
not appealed to.
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that the portion of the Comstock Law which provides for punishment sub-
sequent to the mailing of obscene matter is in all respects valid and
enforceable. But very difficult questions of judicial administration and
procedure, particularly at the trial level, remain to be resolved.
B. Problems of Administration in the Wake of Roth
The refusal of the Supreme Court in Roth to examine the jury finding
of obscenity seems to imply that the question of what is obscene is a matter
of fact to be found by the jury and is not subject to constitutional review.2"
While this is the implication of Roth, the Court made no pronouncement
on this point. Mr. Justice Harlan, in his dissenting opinion in Roth, took
strong exception to the idea that the jury should have the final word on
what is and what is not obscene, thereby determining what is and what
is not protected expression. He argued that every communication has an
individuality and value of its own and that suppression raises an individual
constitutional problem which necessitates that an appellate court determine
for itself whether the communication is suppressible within constitutional
standards.2' Some doubt as to whether the jury will be left as the final
repository of wisdom on this question is raised by two recent per curiam
decisions of the Supreme Court.2" In both cases the Court, without opinion,
reversed lower court decisions finding certain mail matter obscene and
upholding the Postmaster General's refusal to transmit it. In both deci-
sions the Court simply cited Roth. As Judge Desmond of the New York
Court of Appeals said, in reference to these cases, "Presumably, the court
having looked at those books simply held them not to be obscene."2
If this be the case, then unless the Court is willing to make a distinction
based upon who the trier of fact happens to be, it would seem that the
question of obscenity in individual cases is still open for constitutional
review.24 It should be noted, however, that if the Supreme Court does
20Cf. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Hendricks, 262 F.2d 392, 398 (9th Cir. 1958), reversing
147 F. Supp. 337 (S.D. Cal. 1958).21The late Judge Jerome Frank also opposed the idea of allowing the jury the final say
on the question of obscenity. But his opposition was based primarily on a distrust of the jury
system Referring to Judge Learned Hand's words in United States v. Kennerley, 209 Fed.
119, 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1913), Frank said, "Judge L. Hand there said that a jury is especially
equipped to determine the 'social sense of what is right' at 'any given time.' He repeated that
idea in United States v. Levine, 2 Cir., 1936, 83 F.2d 156, 157. I have my doubts. For any
particular single jury may not at all represent the 'average' views of the community, especially
on such a subject [as obscenity)." Roth v. Goldman, 172 F.2d 788, 795 n. 30 (2d Cit. 1949)
(concurring opinion), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 938 (1949).22Sunshine Book Co. v. Summerfield, 355 U.S. 372 (1958) (per curiam), reversing 249
F.2d 114 (D.C. Cit. 1957); One, Inc. v. Olesen, 355 U.S. 371 (1958) (per curiam), re-
versing 241 F.2d 772 (9th Cit. 1957).23Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the University of New York, 4 N.Y.2d
349, 368, 151 N.E.2d 197, 207, 175 N.Y.S.2d 39, 54 (1958) (concurring opinion). The
books in question were a nudist magazine depicting nude men and women and a magazine
devoted to homosexuality.24The most recent Supreme Court pronouncement on criminal prosecution for obscenity
is Smith v. California, 80 Sup. Ct. 215 (1959). In this case the appellant, a bookstore
proprietor, was convicted of violating § 41.01.1 of the Municipal Code of Los Angeles which
makes it unlawful "... for any person to have in his possession any obscene... writing [or]
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review local jury findings of obscenity, distortion of the standard of con-
temporary community feeling will result.25
An evidentiary problem also exists. Under the rules of evidence of the
common law, if a man is to be convicted of a crime, the evidence to sup-
port the conviction must appear in the record. As a general rule in ob-
scenity prosecutions, the state or federal government merely puts the
objectionable matter in evidence and shows that the proscribed act was
done by the accused.26 Roth requires that before communications may be
condemned as obscene they must be found to be violative of contemporary
community standards of decency. Query then whether the prosecution
must attempt to place in evidence expert testimony as to what that com-
munity standard is.27 If this is not required, the jury will have to furnish
this finding without any evidence in the record.28
Perhaps the most significant problem is the proper method of weighing
allegedly objectionable matter as a whole to determine its character. In
the Roth case the trier of fact had a comparatively easy time in finding
that the matter taken as a whole had as its dominant theme the appeal
book ... in any place of business where . . books . . . are sold or kept for sale." A jail
sentence was imposed on the appellant solely because of his possession of a book found to be
obscene. The lower state courts construed the Los Angeles Ordinance as not requiring scienter,
thus imposing strict or absolute criminal liability. The appellant contended below that the
ordinance as construed conflicted with the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution. The
United States Supreme Court agreed with this contention, reversing the conviction and striking
down the ordinance.
The Court reasoned that "by dispensing with any requirement of knowledge of the con-
tents of the book on the part of the seller, the ordinance tends to impose a severe limitation
on the public's access to constitutionally-protected matter. For if the bookseller is criminally
liable without knowledge of the contents, and the ordinance fulfills its purpose, he will tend
to restrict the books he sells to those he has inspected; and thus the State will have imposed
a restriction upon the distribution of constitutionally protected as well as obscene literature."
Id. at 218.2 5The test laid down in Roth seems to require that the final determination be left to the
local jury. The only reasonable contemporary community would seem to be one delineated
either by the particular audience to whom the objectionable material is directed or by the
geographical area from which the material is mailed. The contemporary community standard
of a small rural town is likely to be quite different from that of a sophisticated urban area
such as Washington, D. C. It would be a rare judge, indeed, who, while living elsewhere,
could accurately gauge the contemporary community standard of decency of the place where
the case arises.
26C. Roth v. Goldman, 172 F.2d 788, (2d Cir. 1949), cart. denied, 337 U.S. 938
(1949); Grove Press, Inc. v. Christenberry, 175 F. Supp. 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).2 7
1n Grove Press, Inc. v. Christenberry, supra note 26, at 502, it is suggested that certain
other expressions of the contemporary community standard might be admitted. "Surely ex-
pressions by leading newspapers, with circulations of millions, are some evidence at least as
to what the limits of tolerance by present day community standards are, if we must embark
upon a journey of exploration into such uncharted territory." It must be noted that this case
involved an administrative determination of obscenity. In administrative proceedings the
rules of evidence are greatly relaxed. To admit such evidence in a federal court would require
another exception to the hearsay rule.2 8 Frank, J., has protested this type of procedure. "[Hie [the Postmaster General] made
no express finding about that attitude.
"We thus do not know how he arrived at his conclusion as to obscenity. To sustain his
order, we must, at a minimum, read into the record an implied . . . determination that the
book is at odds with the 'average conscience of the time.' . . . In effect, we are asked to
infer that he invoked something like judicial notice." Roth v. Goldman, 172 F.2d 788, 795
(2d Cir. 1949) (concurring opinion), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 938 (1949).
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to prurient interest.2" The material was commercially produced solely to
titilate and arouse sexual desire. Condemnation of so-called "hard core"
pornography should prove to be no problem. But the Roth standard will
provide difficulty when applied to "mixed ' matter. For example, what will
be proper bases for a jury to decide the nature of a magazine or anthology
containing certain features or stories, condemnable as obscene in isolation,
and also containing other features or stories which are not objectionable?
If the jury condemns the magazine or anthology as a whole because of
the presence of a certain amount of obscenity, material otherwise pro-
tectible under the first amendment will tend to be suppressed. Certainly
a publication's character should not be decided by comparing the number
of "clean" pages to the number of "dirty" pages and then absolving or
condemning the publication on the basis of the count. -Something more
appears to be needed. That something should be the factor of the author's
or publisher's sincerity. The Roth standard seems concerned only with
audience reaction and not with the purpose of the author or publisher.
If an otherwise innocent publication is purposely used as a vehicle for
the dissemination of one obscene passage or story, then a jury should be
justified in finding that the dominant theme of the publication taken as a
whole appeals to prurient interest. At least three important lower federal
court cases have emphasized the propriety of investigating the sincerity of
the author or publisher.8"
II. PRIOR ADMINISTRATIVE RESTRAINTS
From the time man first began to communicate with his fellow man
others have attempted to stifle at its source expression which to them was
dangerous or hateful. Licensing and censorship prior to publication are
far more effective means of suppressing expression than criminal punish-
ment subsequent to publication, for in the former case the expression
proceeded against never sees the light of day."' It seems natural then that
the Post Office Department should seize upon this powerful weapon of
prior administrative restraint to suppress the mail flow of supposedly
obscene and pornographic matter.
29While the trial judge's instructions in this regard were not exactly in the terms em-
ployed by the Supreme Court in its opinion, they were sufficiently similar to justify affirmance
of Roth's conviction.
3OUnited States v. Dennett, 39 F.2d 564 (2d Cir. 1930) (prosecution for violation of
now § 1461 of the Criminal Code); Grove Press, Inc. ,v. Christenberry, 175 F. Supp. 488
(S.D.N.Y. 1959); United States v. One Book Called 'Ulysses," 5 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y.
1933), a'd, 72 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1934) (libel under § 305 of the Tariff Act of 1930).
See Lockhart & McClure, sapra note 9, at 349-50.
BlSo great a poet as John Milton felt the sting of the censor's pencil. His famous essay,
"Areopagitica," published in 1644, was a plea for a free and unlicensed press. But as late as
1925 the Minnesota legislature attempted to set up a system of prior restraints on the press
of the state. In the landmark case of Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931), the Supreme
Court struck down the Minnesota legislation.
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A. Legislative Authority for Administrative Restraint
In setting up an elaborate procedure to prevent the mailing of obscene
and pornographic matter,32 the Post Office Department cites Section 1461
of the Criminal Code for its authority. But whether Congress intended to
give the Department this authority is not free from doubt. The Comstock
Law as originally enacted said only that obscene matter was not to be
carried in the mails. It provided criminal penalties for persons who know-
ingly sent or received such matter.3 Its wording is similar to that of the
act of 186534 which was intended to operate only as a criminal statute.3 5
Because of the absence of any express suggestion in the legislative history
of the 1873 act that the Post Office was to exercise censorial power to
restrain suspected mail, 6 it can be argued that this statute, too, was in-
tended to operate only as a penal statute and, therefore, the Post Office
does not presently have authority to restrain mail on the ground that it
is or may be obscene.3 Judicial opinion on this subject is sharply divided. 8
B. The Constitutionality of Administrative Restraints
Assuming the existence of authority from Congress, it becomes neces-
sary to examine the constitutionality of the system of mail restraint created
by the Post Office Department. For many years following the enactment
of the Comstock Law the Post Office exercised in summary fashion its
assumed power to restrain the mailing of obscene matter.3 Notice and the
right to be heard were not extended to senders, whose mail was rejected
32See 39 C.F.L § § 14.1, 14.3 (1955); 39 C.F.R. §§ 14.10, 203.1-203.14 (Supp. 1959).
3 3"[ljo obscene, lewd, or lascivious book, pamphlet, picture, paper, print, or other
publication of an indecent character... shall be carried in the mail, and any person who
shall knowingly deposit, or cause to be deposited, for mailing or delivery, any of the herein-
before-mentioned articles or things ... shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor.... 17
Stat. 599 (1873).
3413 Stat. 507 (1865).
3sSee CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 450, 654, 660-66, 965-66 (1865); Paul &
Schwartz, supra note 1, at 217 n. 9.
30See CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 3d Sess. 1240, 1307, 1358, 1371, 1436, 2004 (1873).37This argument is made in Sunshine Book Co. v. Summerfield, 249 F.2d 114, 121
(D.C. Cir. 1957) (dissenting opinion), re'd per curiam, 355 U.S. 372 (1958) (citing
Roth v. United States), and in Paul & Schwartz, supra note 1, at 217. However, the argument
loses some force because the undebated recodification of the 1873 act declared obscenity to
be nonmailable and prohibited its conveyance or delivery by the Post Office. 19 Star. 90
(1876). This clearly implies authority in the Post Office Department to restrain the mailing
of obscenity and the language of the 1876 act has been retained in the present statute. See 18
U.S.C. § 1461 (1958).38Cases holding for such authority in the Post Office Department include Sunshine Book
Co. v. Summerfield, 249 F.2d 114 (D.C. Cir. 1957), affirming 128 F. Supp. 564 (D.D.C.
1955), reVd per curiam, 355 U.S. 372 (1958) (citing Roth v. United States); Roth v. Gold-
man, 172 F.2d 788 (2d Cir. 1949) (by implication), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 938 (1949);
Glanzman v. Christenberry, 175 F. Supp. 485 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); Monart, Inc. v. Christen-
berry, 168 F. Supp. 654 (S.D.N.Y. 1958). Judicial opinion denying the existence of such
authority includes Sunshine Book Co. v. Summerfield, 249 P.2d 114, 120 (D.C. Cir. 1957)
(dissenting opinion by Washington, J.); Grove Press, Inc. v. Christenberry, 175 F. Supp. 488
(S.D.N.Y. 1959) (dictum).39See Walker v. Popenoe, 149 F.2d 511 (D.C. Cir. 1945); de Grazia, Obscenity and
the Mail: A Study of Administrative Restraint, 20 LAw & CONTEmP. PROB. 608, 609 (1955).
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or destroyed. Finally, in Walker v. Popenoe ° the District of Columbia
Circuit held that this summary procedure violated fifth amendment due
process. The court said that due process could only be satisfied by accord-
ing notice and an opportunity to be heard before the mailing privilege is
suspended. The court was not impressed with the Post Office's argument
that notice and hearing before restraint would permit the distribution of
obscene matter until the hearing could be concluded and a decision rendered
and pointed out that the sender of obscene mail could be arrested imme-
diately pursuant to Section 1461 and that if he were released on bail the
conditions of that bail should be sufficient to discourage repetition of the
offense before trial.
This case should have made clear to the Post Office that it was treading
on dangerous constitutional ground. However, several years elapsed before
the Department promulgated regulations to govern procedure in restrain-
ing supposedly obscene mail.4 These regulations provide for detailed
notice to the mailer,42 the mailer's right to answer the notice,43 oppor-
tunity for the mailer to seek an informal compromise with the Depart-
ment,44 and fair hearing for the mailer, " with the burden of proof placed
upon the General Counsel of the Post Office Department.46 Significantly,
however, the regulations do not meet the one requirement of procedural
due process stressed in the Popenoe case. The regulations specifically pro-
vide that when there is doubt as to the mailability of any matter "it shall
be withheld from dispatch or delivery and a sample, or a complete state-
ment of the facts submitted to the General Counsel for instructions.""
If the General Counsel believes that the mail matter may be obscene, the
restraint is continued and notice and hearing are then accorded. 8 Thus,
the Post Office continues to restrain the mail prior to notice and hearing
contrary to the holding in Walker v. Popenoe. This procedure was recently
protested by a minority of the court in Sunshine Book Co. v. Summerfield,"
another decision of the District of Columbia Circuit. But the majority
implicitly endorsed the present procedure and one concurring judge spe-
cifically stated that such procedure was permissible."
4oSupra note 39 (concurring opinion concurred in by entire court).
41See de Grazia, supra note 39, at 610.





4739 C.F.R. § 14.10 (Supp. 1959).
4839 C.F.R. § 203.1 (Supp. 1959).
49249 F.2d 114 (D.C. Cir. 1957), affirming 128 F. Supp. 564 (D.D.C. 1955), rav'd
per curiam, 355 U.S. 372 (1958). "Another aspect of the case is equally disturbing. More
than a decade ago we held in Walker v. Popenoe ... that a hearing must precede the bar-
ring of published matter from the mails. Here, the Department refused to accept the magazine
for mailing, and held a hearing after its refusal had become effective. We expressly con-
demned such an interference with freedom of the press in the Walker case. Id. at 122-23
(dissenting opinion).
50Sunshine Book Co. v. Summerfield, sapra note 49, at 120 (Fahy, J., concurring).
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This, of course, does not settle the matter. Only the Supreme Court's
view of what is and what is not procedural due process will be decisive.
It can be argued that the Supreme Court will uphold the present procedure
by analogy with its recent holding in Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown.51
In that case a narrow majority upheld the constitutionality of a New York
statute allowing law enforcement officers to obtain court orders enjoining
the sale or distribution of any publication or writing alleged to be obscene
before a trial of the legal issues is held. Certainly the effect of the New
York statute is the same as that of the questioned postal regulation-it
authorizes administrative restraint prior to hearing.
While the analogy seems to be a reasonable one, the closeness of the vote
in the Kingsley Book case precludes any definite conclusion on this issue.
It must be noted that Mr. Justice Harlan was counted among the majority
in Kingsley Books. In his concurrence in Alberts v. California" and in his
dissent in Roth, he distinguished between the state's power to move against
obscenity and the federal government's power. Mr. Justice Harlan would
more narrowly circumscribe the federal government's power because of
its potential to infringe freedom of expression throughout the entire United
States.
Furthermore, the New York statute53 is distinguishable from the postal
regulations in that it provides for trial very shortly after the injunction
pendente lite is issued. The postal regulations provide only that a hearing
shall be held within ten days of notice,54 but there is nothing in the regu-
lations requiring expeditious notice. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, speaking for
the majority in Kingsley Books, made it clear that the holding was to be
closely confined ". . . so as to preclude what may fairly be deemed
licensing or censorship." 5
While the Post Office Department's procedures may meet the standards
of procedural due process, the question of whether the administrative
restraints on the mail violate first amendment guarantees must also be
considered. Superficially, it might seem that no problem exists in this
realm because of the Roth holding that obscenity is not a protected form
of expression. And if this were not enough, the Court also held in Kingsley
Books that at least one limited form of prior restraint by the state did not
violate the first and fourteenth amendments. However, it must be remem-
bered that Roth was a criminal prosecution and Kingsley Books a very
narrow holding. Following these decisions Judge Fuld of the New York
Court of Appeals asserted that prior administrative restraint over motion
51354 U.S. 436 (1957) (five to four decision). This was the position taken by Judge
Fahy in the Sunshine Book case.
52354 U.S. 476 (1957) (decided with Roth v. United States).
53N.Y. CODE CrM. PROC. § 22-a.
5439 C.F.R. § 203.3 (Supp. 1959).
55IKingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436,441 (1957).
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pictures still violated the first and fourteenth amendments." Judge Fuld's
position is that a distinction has been drawn by the Supreme Court between
criminal prosecutions following publication and restraints prior to publi-
cation." For support he relies on a number of motion picture censorship
cases in which the Court, in every instance, reversed lower court approval
of prior licensing."8 Significantly, the Supreme Court has never approved
prior state restraints on supposedly obscene motion pictures or federal
restraints on supposedly obscene mail.6"
If a distinction does exist, the underlying rationale must be that prior
restraint is much more destructive of freedom than subsequent punishment.
Men are free only so long as they may choose to remain silent or to express
what they believe to be true regardless of the consequences. This choice is
denied them when effective prior restraints are employed. Thus, while
obscenity is not protected utterance, the method chosen to root it out may
be so corrosive of a free society that the method itself violates constitutional
guarantees.
One further possibility of unconstitutionality presents itself. In Roth,
a criminal case, the Supreme Court held that the wording of Section 1461
was not too vague and uncertain to apprise individuals of acts which the
statute proscribes."' But the Court did not have before it the question of
whether the statute provides sufficient standards for the guidance of the
Post Office in its censorial activities, assuming the statute gives authority
5 6Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the University of New York, 4 N.Y.2d
349, 373-74, 151 N.E.2d 197, 211, 175 N.Y.S.2d 39, 59-60 (1958) (dissenting opinion),
rev'd, 360 U.S. 684 (1959).5 7Judge Fuld limited the significance of the Kingsley Book case in the following way.
"In reaching the conclusion that a system of prior administrative censorship is unconstitutional,
I have in mind that even the limited injunctive process, with provision for prompt trial by
the court, was recently regarded by four justices of the Supreme Court as an impermissible
prior restraint.... Indeed, the majority of the court as well ...went on, significantly, to
say, 'the limitation is the exception; it is to be closely confined so as to preclude what may
fairly be deemed licensing or censorship.' " Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp.'v. Regents of the
University of New York, supra note 56, at 373, 151 N.E.2d at 211, 175 N.Y.S.2d at 59. For
other judicial opinion subsequent to Kingsley Books that this distinction may still exist, see
Sunshine Book Co. v. Summerfield, 249 F.2d 114, 121 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (dissenting opinion),
affrming 128 F. Supp. 564 (D.D.C. 1955), rev'd per curiam, 355 U.S. 372 (1958); Para-
mount Film Distrib. Corp. v. City of Chicago, 172 F. Supp. 69, 70 (N.D. II. 1959).
5sSee Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the University of New York, 360 U.S.
684 (1959); Times Film Corp. v. Chicago, 355 U.S. 35 (1957) (per curiam); Holmby
Prod. Inc. v. Vaughn, 350 U.S. 870 (1955) (per curiam); Superior Films, Inc. v. Depart-
ment of Educ., 346 U.S. 587 (1954) (per curiam); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S.
495 (1952); Gelling v. Texas, 343 U.S. 960 (1952) (per curiam). However, all of these
cases can be explained either on the ground that the licensors attempted to censor unpopular
ideas protected by the first amendment or that the Supreme Court independently decided the
films were not obscene.
5 9Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the University of New York, 4 N.Y.2d
349, 368, 151 N.E.2d 197, 207, 175 N.Y.S.2d 39, 54 (1958) (concurring opinion), rev'd,
360 U.S. 684 (1959).
50See Sunshine Book Co. v. Summerfield, 355 U.S. 372 (1958) (per curiam); One,
Inc. v. Olesen, 355 U.S. 371 (1958) (per curiam).
OlAll the statute provides in this regard is that obscenity is nonmailable matter "... and
shall not be conveyed in the mails or delivered from any post office or by any letter carrier."
18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1958).
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for such activity.62 The Court could read the Roth standard into that part
of the statute purporting to confer authority on the Post Office and say
that this is a sufficient guide. But on the other hand, the Court could either
refuse to do this or could hold that the broad generalized standard of Roth
is not sufficiently precise and definite for cases involving prior restraints on
expression. Indefinite or nonexistent standards for the suppression of un-
protected utterances would be violative of the first amendment because of
the danger created that protected expression might also be suppressed.
In spite of the strong arguments that can be made against the consti-
tutionality of administrative restraint on the mails, it is submitted that the
present state of constitutional law, reading the Roth and Kingsley Book
cases together, compels the conclusion that some limited form of prior
restraint is permissible. Under the postal power Congress would appear
to be empowered to authorize the Post Office to restrain obscenity in the
mails. But the present law is too broad and indefinite. If Congress wishes
to insure continued postal activity in this field, it should consider legisla-
tion which would embody the standard for obscenity laid down in Roth
and, if at all possible, should establish more specific guides for the Post
Office.63 As a sweeping change, Congress might consider the feasibility of
taking administration from the Post Office. This could be done by requiring
local postmasters to seek orders pendente lite from United States District
Courts restraining the mailing of questionable matter until obscenity hear-
ings could be held in the district courts. Congress could require the presence
of a jury if requested by the mailer. To insure procedural due process, the
legislation should require that expeditious notice and hearing be accorded
the mailer.
C. Problems Created by Roth in Administration of
Postal Restraints
As in the case of criminal prosecutions under Section 1461, an evi-
dentiary problem arises in the administration of postal restraints. At the
administrative hearing in the case of Lady Chatterley's Lover, 4 the General
Counsel for the Post Office merely introduced the book in evidence without
offering any additional evidence as to whether the controversial novel
"taken as a whole" violated "contemporary community standards" of
62But such attempts have generally been unsuccessful. See, e.g., Kingsley Intl Pictures
Corp. v. Regents of the University of New York, 4 App. Div. 2d 348, 165 N.Y.S.2d 681
(1957) rev'd 4 N.Y.2d 349 (1958) (discussion of the word "immoral"); State v. Smith,
108 N.E.2d 582 (Ohio Mun. Ct. 1952) (discussion of the standard that motion pictures
must be "moral, educational, or amusing and harmless in character"). In the Kingsley Pictures
case the appellate division of the New York Supreme Court said that "adding more adjectives
or more words which are likewise open to different opinions helps little." Kingsley Int'l
Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the University of New York, supra at 349-50, 165 N.Y.S.2d
at 683.
0 3See dissenting opinion of Brennan, J., in Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436
(1957).
04Grove Press, Inc. v. Christenberry, 175 F. Supp. 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
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decency. And when the senders, Grove Press, Inc., and Reader's Sub-
scription, Inc., attempted to introduce favorable newspaper stories and
editorial comment on the publication of the book to show contemporary
community acceptance of the novel, this material was excluded."5 Thus,
when the Postmaster General decided that Lady Chatterley's Lover, to the
average man, violated contemporary community standards of decency, he
had no evidence before him as what that standard was. Obviously, the
Postmaster must have supplied, sub silentio, an implied determination,
based on his own knowledge and experience, that the book violated the
prescribed standard. This type of off-the-record decision-making has been
severely questioned by members of the federal judiciary." Such procedure
seems entirely at odds with the common law ideal of decision-making only
on the basis of the record before the decision-maker. While it might be
concluded that the Supreme Court in Roth intended to put its faith in local
juries to make such secret determinations, 7 there is nothing in the cases
to indicate that the Court intended to repose such trust in one administra-
tive official.
A more subtle, but nonetheless important, conflict between the standard
laid down in Roth and present postal practice arises from the rather amor-
phous concept of the "variable audience." As yet, there has been no elabo-
ration by the Supreme Court as to how the particular community is to be
isolated for purposes of applying the Roth standard to specific individual
obscenity cases. When the Court used the word "community," did the Jus-
tices have in mind a general American community, or did they mean the
local community in which the matter was published or mailed? Or did they
mean that the community should be defined in terms of the potential
audience to be reached by the mailing?" If this last possibility involves
the correct way to define "community," then distortion of the standard
is inevitable when final administrative determinations of obscenity are
made outside the relevant community by persons in Washington, D.C.0
Suppose the mailer wishes to send his publication only to people in rural
Midwestern areas. Theoretically, then, the community standard to be
65Expert literary testimony of Malcolm Cowley and Alfred Kazin was admitted. These
men testified to contemporary acceptance of literature dealing with sex and gave their own
opinions as to the acceptability today of the unexpurgated version of Lady Chatterley': Lover.
See Grove Press, Inc. v. Christenberry, supra note 64.
66See note 28 supra and Grove Press, Inc. v. Christenberry, supra note 64.
C7So great a judge as Learned Hand believes that juries should have this responsibility.
'[O]bscenity' is a function of many variables, and the verdict of the jury is not the con-
clusion of a syllogism of which they are to find only the minor premiss [sic], but really a
small bit of legislation ad hoc, like the standard of care." United States v. Levine, 83 F.2d
156, 157 (2d Cir. 1936).
51This third possibility has been suggested by Palmieri, J., in United States v. 31 Photo-
graphs, 156 F. Supp. 350 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) (libel under § 305 (a) of the Tariff Act of 1930).
"I believe . . . that the more inclusive statement of the definition is that which judges the
material by its appeal to 'all those whom it is likely to reach.' "Id. at 354.
69 The hearing is held and the decision rendered in Washington, D. C. 39 C.F.R. § 203.8
(Supp. 1959).
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applied in determining the character of the mailing must be that of the
mailer's potential audience-the standard of decency of the rural Mid-
western farm community. Only persons within the potential audience-
community would be qualified to apply this standard. But under the postal
regulations the local postmaster, who might himself be within the audi-
ence-community, must send the matter to the more sophisticated Eastern
urban center of Washington, D.C., for judgment by officials outside the
potential audience-community. If the community is to be defined in terms
of potential audience, the more localized the determination the less the
distortion of the standard.7" Much distortion would be eliminated by legis-
lation providing for local jury hearings on the character of questioned
mailings.
E. Scope of Judicial Review of Administrative
Decisions on Nonmailability
Before a federal district court may review a Post Office determination
that particular matter deposited for mailing is obscene, the court may be
faced with the contention that the proper scope of review of administra-
tive decisions precludes a de novo determination by the district court on
this issue. Such was the government's position in Grove Press, Inc. v.
Christenberry7 1 the Lady Chatterley's Lover case. The government con-
tended that the Postmaster's finding that the book was obscene was one of
fact made by an administrative body, and as such could not be questioned
in the district court. In dismissing this argument, Judge Bryan reasoned
that since an obscenity ruling did not depend on a fair estimate of the
worth of testimony before the administrative body or an informed judg-
ment by the body on matters within its special competence, such a ruling
did not fall with the doctrine of Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB.72 This
case requires a hands-off policy by the district courts on certain agency rul-
ings and findings. Judge Bryan's reasoning appears persuasive in light of
the fact that the only evidence generally offered at these Post Office hear-
ings is the suspected mail matter itself. Thus, a district court judge is in
as good a position to evaluate the character of the mailing as the Post-
master. Furthermore, it can hardly be argued that the Post Office Depart-
ment has the same kind of technical competence to evaluate literary
endeavor and contemporary moral standards as the Securities and Exchange
Commission has in evaluating security transactions or the Federal Com-
munications Commission has in regulating the allocation of radio fre-
quencies. The Post Office's only special competence would seem to lie in
701t has been recognized by law enforcement officials that community standards of decency
may vary widely even within a single state. See Los Angeles Mirror News, Nov. 9, 1959,
1, p. 4, col. 1.
71175 F. Supp. 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
72340 U.S. 474 (1951).
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the field of physical transmission of the mail.7" Hence, the district courts,
particularly in view of the important constitutional questions implicit in
banning printed matter from the mail, would seem to have the duty to
consider the question of obscenity de novo."4
F. Obscenity Determinations Under Present Law
Once the question of obscenity is reached, few if any generalizations are
possible. It might be stated that "hard core" pornography may always be
proscribed. But then the question is presented as to what is included within
the generic term "hard core" pornography." No one can really be sure,
particularly in view of the recent trend of the federal courts to keep within
very narrow bounds expression which can properly be denied constitutional
protection. Three recent mail obscenity cases illustrate this trend.
In One, Inc. v. Olesen76 the Supreme Court reversed a Ninth Circuit
ruling affirming a district court denial of a mandatory injunction to require
the Los Angeles postmaster to mail a particular issue of "One," a magazine
devoted to a "scientific, historical and critical study of homosexuality."
The Ninth Circuit found offensive an article entitled "Sappho Remem-
bered," which detailed a lesbian's influence on a young woman's struggle
to choose between normal married life and lesbianism. The final triumph
of lesbianism particularly incensed the court. In its per curiam reversal
the Supreme Court cited only the Roth case in explanation. It would seem,
then, that the Court was holding either that the article was not obscene or
that the magazine taken as a whole was not obscene. 7
73"[-H]e [the Postmaster General] has no special competence to determine what con-
situtes obscenity within the meaning of Section 1461 or that 'contemporary community
standards are not such that this book should be allowed to be transmitted in the mails' or
that the literary merit of the book is outweighed by its pornographic features. . . .Such
questions involve interpretation of a statute ... and its application to the allegedly offending
material. The determination of such questions is peculiarly for the courts...." Grove Press,
Inc. v. Christenberry, 175 F. Supp. at 495.74The action of the Supreme Court in One, Inc. v. Olesen, 355 U.S. 371 (1958) (per
curiam), and Sunshine Book Co. v. Summerfield, 355 U.S. 372 (1958) (per curiam), tends
to support this conclusion. See also Sunshine Book Co. v. Summerfield, 249 F.2d 114, 120
and n. 4 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (dissenting opinion), in which it was said that broad authority
exists to review even purely factual matters when freedom of speech and of the press is in-
volved. Bat see Roth v. Goldman, 172 F.2d 788 (2d Cit. 1949), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 938
(1949).7sNo less a controversial literary figure than D. H. Lawrence has said that pornography
must be censored rigorously. He has said that "pornography is the attempt to insult sex, to
do dirt on it. This is unpardonable. Take ... the picture post-card ...What I have seen
of them have been of an ugliness to make you cry. The insult to the human body, the insult
to a vital human relationship! Ugly and cheap they make the human nudity, ugly and de-
graded they make the sexual act, trivial and cheap and nasty." LAwRENCiE, SHX, ITnRATuRI ,
AND CmqsoRsmp 69 (1959). That his definition may be too broad is seen by the speculation
of a Lawrence scholar that Lawrence would have included James Joyce's "Ulysses" within this
classification. Id. at 25 (introduction by Harry T. Moore). "Ulysses" was approved for general
importation into this country by Judge Woolsey in United States v. One Book Called "Ulysses,"
5 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1933), aff'd 72 F.2d 705 (2d Cit. 1934).
76355 U.S. 371 (1958), reversing per curiam 241 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1957).
77See concurring opinion of Desmond, J., in Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents
of the University of New York, 4 N.Y.2d 349, 368, 151 N.E.2d 197, 207, 175 N.Y.S.2d 39,
54 (1958), rev'd, 360 U.S. 684 (1959). A slightly different view of this reversal was taken
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In Sunshine Book Co. v. Summerfleld,78 a case similar to One, Inc., the
Supreme Court reversed a District of Columbia Circuit decision affirming
a district court denial of a mandatory injunction to require the Postmaster
General to order the transmission of particular issues of "Sunshine &
Health" and "Sun," magazines espousing the cause of nudism in America.
In its opinion the majority of the District of Columbia Circuit made a
page-by-page analysis of the two magazines. The court began by admitting
that the texts of the magazines, which described the nudist way of life,
were not offensive. What caused the majority to hold as it did were several
photographs of nude men and women, depicted either separately or to-
gether with their generative organs visible. According to the majority, the
illustration of male and female genitals was sufficiently indecent as to
taint the magazine as a whole. The Supreme Court again reversed per
curiam citing Roth. Thus, though it might once have been thought that
the mere depiction of human genitals by photography was pornographic
per se, that view can no longer be accepted." Today, the context in which,
the photographs appear must be carefully examined to determine whether
the publication as a whole has for its dominant theme the appeal to pruri-
ent interest. The Supreme Court's decision here may well have turned on
the fact that the textual material in the magazines was inoffensive."°
Finally, in Grove Press, Inc. v. Christenberry,8" the most publicized of
the recent obscenity cases, a district judge granted a permanent injunction
requiring the New York City postmaster to transmit through the mails
the unexpurgated version of D. H. Lawrence's Lady Chatterley's Lover.82
Grove Press and Readers Subscription had attempted to send circulars pro-
claiming publication of the novel and the novel itself through the mail.
The New York postmaster restrained dispatch of this material and sent
samples to Washington where, after notice and hearing pursuant to rega-
by Chambers, J., in Eastman Kodak Co. v. Hendricks, 262 F.2d 392, 396 (9th Cir. 1958),
reversing 147 F. Supp. 337 (S.D. Cal. 1958). "This court simply takes the view that the
only sensible explanation of the reversal of One, Inc., is the Supreme Court decided 'the wrong
yardstick' was used."
78355 U.S. 372 (1958).
79The idea that certain things could be obscene or pornographic per se -without reference
to their use or potential audience has been generally discredited in the federal courts. See
United States v. 31 Photographs, 156 F. Supp. 350 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
SOThis again raises the question as to how juries or administrative officials are to weigh
material which may be partly offensive and partly innocent. The question of the author's
or publisher's sincerity of purpose would seem to be an important factor here. In the Sun-
shine Book case the Court might have believed that the depiction of healthy bodies simply
served to promote the idea of nudism-an idea protected by the first amendment. Cf. Kingsley
Int'l Corp. v. Regents of the University of New York, 360 U.S. 684 (1959).
One highly significant implication of the reversals in One, Inc. and Sunshine Book is
that the Supreme Court has undertaken constitutional review of judge-made determinations
of obscenity in injunction cases. The question is still open as to whether the Court will under-
take such review of jury determinations in criminal cases. Mr. Justice Harlan believes that
the implication in Roth was that the Court would not.
81175 F. Supp. 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
82For the fascinating legal and literary history of this novel, see LAWRENCE, SEx, LrERA-
TuRE, AND CENsoRsHIP 7-30, 82-111 (1959).
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lations, the Postmaster General ruled that the circulars and books were
nonmailable matter within the meaning of Section 1461 of the Criminal
Code. In his findings the Postmaster General analyzed certain frank pas-
sages concerned with the adulterous relationship between Lady Chatterley
and her husband's gamekeeper. He also examined Lawrence's choice of
certain "four-letter" anglo-saxon words describing functions of the genito-
urinary tract. From this analysis the Postmaster concluded that the novel
taken as a whole appealed to prurient interest. He then ordered the New
York City Postmaster to refuse to transmit either the books or the cir-
culars."8 In granting the injunction requiring the New York Postmaster
to ignore this order, District Judge Bryan said that the Postmaster General
had done what the Supreme Court in Roth said should not be done. He
had lifted isolated passages and words, found them to be obscene, and had
condemned the book as a whole without regard to its dominant theme
and purpose. In appraising a book as a whole, the appraiser must look to
the sincerity and honesty of purpose of the author. Judge Bryan found
Lawrence's purpose to be the serious expression of a deep and bitter dis-
satisfaction with the stultifying efforts of an advancing industrialization
together with a demand for a return to "naturalness" in all of life's func-
tions including sex. From the holding in this case it would seem that the
use of "four-letter" words, no matter how vile, and the description of
sexual relations, no matter how frank, will not cause a publication to be
banned from the mails if the Postmaster or the courts determine the
author's or publisher's purpose to be serious.
When the Roth case was first decided it might have been assumed that
authors and publishers would have to be more guarded than ever in their
utterances concerning sex. Since obscenity was not protected expression,
too frank a discussion of man's sexual nature might bring down the wrath
of the censors, both official and self-appointed.' But the cases of One, Inc.,
Sunshine Book, and particularly Grove Press, Inc., seem to indicate that
Roth may be a great liberating force, freeing the serious writer to describe
life as he honestly sees it, without fear of censorship or criminal punish-
ment."5 If man's conduct deviates from his moral codes, then reality should
be portrayed and Portrayed by those most competent to portray it-the
serious writers and artists of contemporary society. The truth may hurt,
but the recent cases seem to say that truth will be served. Thus, perhaps
83Section 1461 also declares material designed to give notice where obscenity may be
obtained to be nonmailable matter.
84For an excellent discussion of extralegal censorship, see Note, 33 N.Y.U.L. RiV. 989
(1958).85While this question of the liberating force of Roth may never be fully settled, it has
been raised. "It may be... that if a work is found to be of literary stature and not 'hard core'
pornography, it is a fortiori within the protections of the First Amendment." Grove Press,
Inc. v. Christenberry, 175 F. Supp. at 503.
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only the commercial purveyors of smut and filth, those who would lie
about the human spirit, need fear the Roth decision. 6
Ill. CONCLUSION
While there is no longer any doubt as to the legality of prosecutions
and convictions under the criminal provisions of Section 1461, serious
questions are raised at every turn with regard to the power of the Post
Office Department to restrain the mailing of supposedly obscene matter.
There is doubt as to the grant of this power by Congress in the first in-
stance. This doubt could, of course, be eliminated by legislative action.
But then the question arises whether Congress itself has constitutional
authority to grant such power. This, as has been pointed out, is a very close
question. Reading Roth and Kingsley Books together, it would seem that
Congress has power in this field. But it is submitted that Kingsley Books
itself is a highly questionable decision because it represents a sharp break
with the Anglo-American tradition of opposition to censorship and prior
restraint." It may well be that the Supreme Court, upon further reflection,
will limit this case to its facts and refuse to extend the rationale to cover
other prior restraints. Until such time as the Court makes further pro-
nouncement on this issue, the Post Office's constitutional authority to
restrain the mail is in doubt. Questions are presently raised also concerning
whether procedures under the postal regulations accord with procedural
due process as required by the fifth amendment.
Because of the shaky structure of the present system of postal regulation,
Congress should attempt a thorough study of the field. But before any
new legislation is proposed Congress should first question the wisdom of
any postal censorship. Not only do prior restraints suppress material
already printed, but they also tend to dull or discourage the literary cre-
ativity of those who might have spoken out but for the fear of censorship."8
One might be willing to endure criminal punishment if he has some assur-
ance that what he expresses will be disseminated. But where prior restraints
bar the way, the serious writer or publisher may be dissuaded by the futility
of the endeavor. Another reason for questioning the wisdom of postal
censorship is that the Post Office Department seems hardly qualified to
weigh literary merit against modern moral standards. The foregoing may
be sufficient reasons in themselves to discard the present system, but the
most penetrating question as to the desirability of administrative restraint
involves fundamental democratic theory.
80For a similar conclusion see Lewis, Power to Censor is Still Unclear, New York Times,
Dec. 20, 1959 § 4, col. 5, p. 8E.
87Compare Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436 (1957) with Near v. Minne-
sota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
888ee Roth v. Goldman, 172 F.2d 788, 790 (2d Cir. 1949) (concurring opinion by
Frank, J.), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 938 (1949).
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The "comstockian mind" demands that the government censor obscene
literature and art on the ground that only by such censorship will the
[normal] reades mind be saved from libidinal moral depravity. The
question is never asked how it can be a proper function of a democratic
government to intrude upon individual morality and compel the individual
to be saved from himself. The individual reader is never asked whether
he wishes to be "saved" by governmental intervention. Nor is the question
asked whether the reader might not prefer to be rescued, if at all, by his
priest or psychoanalyst. Such questions are not asked because they are
basically irrelevant to the pressure for postal censorship; the psychological
need of the "comstockian mind" to save itself from libidinal corruption.89
It is submitted that no great void would be left were Congress to end
postal censorship. The Post Office Department would still have the power
to ask the Justice Department to arrest and prosecute those who attempt
to use the mails to trade in obscenity. Speedy arrest and bail conditioned
upon the cessation of further mail operations should be sufficient to protect
the public against commercial pornography. Furthermore, the Post Office
Department has another string to its bow. In 1950 Congress enacted what
has since come to be called the "mail block" statute." It provides that upon
satisfactory evidence that a person or corporation is engaged in the mailing
of obscene matter the Postmaster General may instruct local postmasters
to withhold matter directed to such person or corporation and to return
the mail to the senders marked "Unlawful." It also forbids postmasters to
pay money orders or postal notes drawn to the order of such person or
corporation.9 This is a powerful weapon because it hits the commercial
purveyor of obscenity where it hurts him most-in his pocketbook. With
the weapons of criminal prosecution and "mail block" at its disposal, there
seems little reason why the Post Office should be allowed to resort to the
essentially antidemocratic procedure of prior censorship to protect a demo-
cratic citizenry.
89de Grazia, Obscenity and the Mail: A Stwdy of Administrative Restraint, 20 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 608, 618 (1955).
9064 Stat. 451 (1950), 39 U.S.C. § 259(a) (1952).
91This statute has been construed to "block" only such return mail and payments as are
connected with the mailing of nonmailable matter. Summerfield v. Sunshine Book Co., 221
F.2d 42 (D.C. Cit.), affirming 128 F. Supp. 564 (D.D.C. 1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 921
(1955).
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